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HABEAS CORPUS-AN EROSION
OF LAW AND ORDER?*
T HE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES REQUIREMENT, presently codified
in Section 2254 of the Judicial. Code,' has traditionally' served
as a condition precedent to the issuance, of 'a federal writ of habeas
corpus. However, recent fedeial and United States .Supreme Court
decisions have initiated major modifications ih the interpretation aid
application of this rule which have made it increasingly evident that
there are-certain situations in. which federal habeas corpus relief can
be sought even though effectiv& state remedies are available. 'These
modifications are indicative of a'recent' trend in the federal judiciarq
to re-define the federal habeas corpus statutes 2 so as to facilitate
the means by which state prisoners with valid constitutional claims
may avail themselves of the federal remedy. Since its inception in
the early 1960's, this liberalizing trend has generated piofus&6 and
animated criticism from local, state, and federal authorities. "It
would, therefore, be. worthwhile 'to investigate the essential objections
of these critics before attempting to evaluate the propriety 'of the
trend and the likelihood of its continuance and acceleration:
*This paper was prepared by the St. Thomas More' Institute for Legal
Reseaich.
1 28 U.S.C.'§ 2254 ("1964), as amended; (Supp.. II, 1965-66). The applicable
subsections "of se tioni 2254 read: ..(b) 'An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in' custody pursuant to the judgment of a State'court shall' not be granted
unless"if appears that the applicant has exhausted 'the remedies available
in the-courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ,ineffective to protect.the rights,,of the. prisoner.
.(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to, have exhausted the remedie5
.available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section,
W f he has 'the right under the -law of the State to raise, by. any available
procedure,' the question presented.. .
228 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1964).. The power to grant the writ is conferred
specifically by section 2241, wbile the habeas corpus procedure is regulated
by section 2242-2255. Note that sections 2241, 2244 and .2254 have- been
amended: 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (d) (Supp. 11, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C.
§2241 (9,64); 28 U.S.Q, §2244 (a), (b), (c) (Supp. II, 1965-66), amending
28 U.S.C. , § 2244 -(,1964); 28,.,.U:S.C., § 2254..,,(a), . (b), (c), (d), (e);
(f) (Supp. II, .1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1964)..r.
The Critics -Essential Objections
Charges have been raised that the
recent attempts to limit the scope of the
exhaustion rule represent a federal con-
spiracy to subvert the habeas corpus rem-
edy into a forum for the automatic re-
trial and review of state criminal pro-
ceedings; it has been imputed that the
remedy is being primed to replace the
right of appeal to the Supreme Court, a
privilege lost to state prisoners in 1916.
One critic has even cynically summarized
this alleged transfiguration from a con-
cept for collateral attack to a concept
for appellate review as a grotesque muta-
tion.5  He warned that unless habeas
corpus was returned to the status of a
purely collateral remedy, the preservation
of an efficient dual system of judicial
administration would be endangered; in
other words, further interference with
state judicial process by the nullification
of state judgments must be effectively
prevented.4  A similar note has been
sounded by District Attorney Evelle J.
Younger,, who has demanded the elim-
ination of the "farce" of endless post-
conviction review and relief, noting that
it is imperative to the efficiency of our
criminal control systems that there be
some point where judgments do actually
3Badger, A Judicial Cul-de-Sac: Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 50 A.B.A.J. 629,
634 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Badger].
4ld. In leveling this criticism, Badger urged a
narrowing of the scope of inquiry to juris-
dictionally related defects only, and favored the
incorporation of the adequate state grounds rule
into federal habeas corpus as the only con-
ceivable means of achieving his proposed
goals.
5Younger, Prosecution Problems, 53 A.B.A.J.
695, 702 (1967).
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become final. To tolerate interminable
review of state judgments and repeated
post-conviction relief, according to Mr.
Younger, is to inject uncertainty into the
judicial process; thus, he urges that rea-
sonable restrictions be imposed upon the
"Great Writ" itself rather than upon
those procedures, e.g., exhaustion, which
inherently limit use of the writ.
It should be pointed out that such cri-
ticism has not emanated solely from state
criminal prosecutors, for only recently a
Florida state court bitterly attacked in-
creased federal intervention in state law
enforcement by way of an expanded
habeas corpus remedy.6 Apparently out-
raged that a federal district court had
granted habeas corpus relief on grounds
which were never raised in a state forum,
Judge Swann, speaking for the court, de-
clared that
[i]t seems that the increasing regulation
of State criminal practice and procedure
by the United States Supreme Court and
the inferior federal courts has encour-
aged a corresponding loss of respect for
law and order. . . . One observes with
mounting concern the dangerous psy-
chological climate that is created when
known criminals who have confessed to
heinous crimes are released because of a
technical defect in police procedure ...
Perhaps the time has come for a little
more concern to be shown for the right
of the great majority to live quietly and
peacefully in their communities, and
greater effort made to enforce law and
order rather than erode it.7
6Simpson v. State, 211 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968).
7 Id. at 866.
HABEAS CORPUS
Furthermore, the United Stgtes Con-
gress, in a proposed, but unsuccessful
amendment" to the recent Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 9
sought to abolish the habeas corpus juris-
diction of the federal courts with respect
to state criminal convictions. The Judi-
cial Committee believed that recent fed-
eral and Supreme Court decisions had
liberalized the use of the writ to such an
extent that the federal habeas corpus
procedure was actually being used as a
substitute for direct appeal. Thus, the
Committee favored total abrogation of
the federal habeas jurisdiction as the
only means of relieving the overburdened
federal courts and restoring order and
finality to state criminal process. Delay
in the enforcement of state judgments of
conviction, abnormally large numbers of
successive petitions by the same individual
over an extended period, and a marked
increase in the number of frivolous and
unmeritorious applications, were cited
by the Committee as factors compelling
adoption of the amendment. Further-
more, the Committee found no constitu-
tional barriers to the proposed action,
8 The proposed but unsuccessful section 2256,
to be added to Title 28, provided that:
State courts' judgments in criminal cases re-
garding questions of law or fact shall be
conclusive unless reversed by a court with
jurisdiction to review by direct appeal or
certiorari, and denies federal court juris-
diction to review State court criminal judg-
ments, except upon appeal or certiorari after
review of such judgments by the highest
court of the State. JuDiciARY COMM., S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 88
(1968).
')Pub. L. No. 90-351 (June: 19, 1968).
asserting that the relevant Supreme Court
decisions were all cases of mere statu-
tory interpretation and that "[c] ompetent
scholarly inquiry has demonstrated irre-
futably . . . that these holdings were a
total distortion of the [1867 habeas cor-
pus statute]." 10 Apparently, the critics
feel that the reasons which originally led
to the development of the exhaustion
doctrine, and the justifications for its
codification into section 2254, still per-
sist, and that even partial abridgment of
the exhaustion rule will recreate the
abuses it has helped to abolish.11
Exhaustion - The Historical
Framework
Common Law Origins
A proper evaluation of the recent
modifications of the exhaustion doctrine,
which have been so severely criticized,
is best begun by an examination of the
historical evolution of that doctrine.
Habeas corpus-"the Great Writ"-has
traditionally concerned itself with the
vindication of a prisoner's right to im-
10 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1968). The Committee also dismissed any
possible objections that might arise under the
Supremacy Clause by alleging that:
1) the writ of habeas corpus referred to in
the Constitution is not the writ that the
Supreme Court has fashioned;
2) the constitutional provisions concern the
federal courts' power to issue writs to inquire
into the detention of persons by federal
rather than state authority; and
3) thus, the Constitution in no way required
Congress to permit federal courts to inquire
into state criminal convictions.
However, the Committee's reasoning is, at
best, questionable.
"1See notes 31 & 32 infra and accompanying
text.
mediate liberty if wrongfully detained.
The root principle of the writ in Anglo-
American jurisprudence has been that
government must be held accountable to
the judiciary for an individual's imprison-
ment; if an incarceration does not con-
form with the fundamental dictates of the
law, the prisoner will be entitled to his
immediate release. 12  In the United
States, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 11
conferred broad habeas corpus powers
upon the federal courts, and the exhaus-
tion of remedies requirement developed as
a judicially created rule limiting the ex-
pansive language of this statute.
The doctrine was born in Ex parte
Royall,"1 a contracts clause case decided
in the post-Reconstruction era, which
held that a state prisoner should fully
utilize available state remedies before the
federal habeas corpus authority would
be exercised. It must be noted, however,
that the doctrine was conceived in Roy-
all as a matter of federal-state comity,
rather than as a mandatory jurisdictional
requirement, and evolved in the later
cases as a matter of accommodation be-
tween federal and state courts. In effect,
the exhaustion rule developed in relation
to the appropriate exercise of the con-
12 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
See also Badger at 629; Comment, Exhaustion
of State Remedies Before Bringing Federal
Habeas Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code
Section 2254, 43 NEBRASKA L. REV. 120, 121
(1964).
13 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 386,
extending the federal habeas corpus power to
"all cases where any person may be restrained
of his or her liberty in violation of the con-
stitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States .. "
14 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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ferred habeas corpus power rather than
as an express limitation found in the act
itself.15  These considerations of comity
which have traditionally regulated the
exercise of the exhaustion doctrine in
the federal courts can best be illustrated
through an examination of the Royall
language. The Supreme Court there
ruled that if a state prisoner claimed he
was restrained in violation of the consti-
tution, the federal circuit court has the
discretion whether it would discharge the
prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus prior
to his trial in the indicting state court.
Furthermore, after the state court had
disposed of the case, the circuit court
would still have the discretion whether to
proceed in habeas corpus to determine
whether the accused, if convicted, was
being unconstitutionally detained or
whether he should be put to his writ of
error from the highest court of the state.' 6
Thus, it was evident that the federal
courts would retain the privilege of dis-
cerning the time and mode in which they
would exert the habeas corpus powers
conferred upon them. It was in this
manner that Royall strongly indicated that
15 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-19 (1963);
Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam); Tolg v. Grimes, 355 F.2d 92, 97
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966);
Hunt v. Warden, 335 F. 2d 936 (4th Cir. 1964);
United States ex rel. Shelton v. Rundle, 278
F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Aflecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Re-
moval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort
State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 887-
89 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam];
Badger at 630; Comment, supra note 12, at
121.
16 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
HABEAS CORPUS
the newly expounded exhaustion of
remedies doctrine was to be developed as
a matter of federal-state comity, for the
Court explicitly warned that
[this] discretion should be exercised in
the light of the relations existing, under
our system of government, between the
judicial tribunals of the Union and of
the States, and in recognition of the fact
that the public good requires that those
relations be not disturbed by unneces-
sary conflict between courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights se-
cured by the Constitution.17
This statement clearly indicates that
the Royall Court did not intend to ini-
tiate the exhaustion requirement as a
quasi-statutory mandate to be strictly
applied in every federal habeas corpus
proceeding. To the contrary, the Court,
in Royall, and subsequent cases, desired
only to describe what procedure should
ordinarily be followed in the state courts
before bringing habeas corpus in the
federal courts.18 Such a conclusion is
firmly supported by the fact that the
Royall Court found it necessary to qualify
their grant of discretion to the circuit
court by insuring that it would be sub-
ordinated to any special circumstances
that would require the immediate disposi-
tion of a petitioner's federal claim. 1'
However, as the Royall doctrine was re-
peatedly applied, it became more inflexi-
bly and mechanically invoked, and the
Supreme Court began to indicate that
the Royall "discretion" belonged to the
17d at 251.
18 See generally Comment, supra note 12, at
123.
19 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
Court itself and to the federal judicial
system as a whole rather than to any
individual federal trial judge. In ad-
hering to this position, the Court in the
years following Royall20 began to regu-
larly reverse circuit and district judges
who refused to abstain from the "anti-
cipatory exercise" of their habeas corpus
jurisdiction. 21
The doctrine reached full pre-statute
growth in Ex parte Hawk,2 2 which sum-
marized the prior case law in the area.
20 The final outcome of the Royall case should
be briefly noted. Since petitioner had not
yet been afforded a state trial and because the
Court could not find any "special circum-
stances," the lower federal court's dismissal of
the habeas corpus petition was affirmed. Thus,
the exhaustion doctrine was conceived with a
determination that federal habeas corpus relief
would not be granted a state prisoner in ad-
vance of state trial. However, the Royall
dictum also indicated that certain post-trial
state procedural remedies should be pursued be-
fore application is made for federal relief.
117 U.S. at 251-54.
21 Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 889 & n.408,
citing, e.g., Moss v. Glenn, 189 U.S. 506
(1903) (per curiam); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S.
284 (1898). For a thorough chronology and
analysis of the post-Royall exhaustion cases
see Amsterdam at 888-92; Badger at 630.
22321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per curiam). Pe-
titioner's contentions had been presented to the
state courts only through an application to the
state supreme court for habeas corpus relief,
which application was denied without opinion.
Normal procedure was for the supreme court
to remit original habeas corpus applications to
the correct state district court, from which an
unsuccesful petitioner could properly appeal to
the state's highest court. Because petitioner had
neither availed himself of this proper state
procedure nor sought a common law writ of
error coram nobis which might have afforded
him relief, he was deemed to have failed to
exhaust his available state remedies. Id. at
116.
The Hawk Court emphasized that federal
tribunals would entertain a state prison-
er's habeas corpus application only after
the diligent exhaustion of any available
state remedies-including all appellate
remedies within the state court process
and in the Supreme Court 23 by appeal
or writ of certiorari. The Court also
reiterated the exceptional circumstances
doctrine, noting that federal courts tend
to refrain from interfering with the state
criminal process where state remedies
have not been exhausted except in "rare
cases" where "exceptional circumstances
of peculiar urgency" have been shown to
exist.24
Codification in Section 2254
In 1948, the Royall doctrine, as it had
been subsequently developed through
Hawk, was embodied in Section 2254 of
the Judicial Code.25  Consequently, Con-
gress accepted the rationale of the Hawk
case as a sound rule to guide considera-
tion of habeas corpus in the federal courts,
thereby making application of the exhaus-
tion requirement a mandatory rather than
discretionary procedure. Section 2254,
23 At this time, a federal habeas corpus pe-
titioner would not have exhausted his avail-
able state remedies until he had unsuccessfully
sought relief in the United States Supreme
Court. However, this requirement was later re-
laxed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435
(1963), overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200 (1950), to the extent that "it may be
thought to have barred a state prisoner from
federal habeas relief if he had failed timely
to seek certiorari in this Court from an ad-
verse state decision."
24 321 U.S. at 117, citing United States ex rel.
Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925).
25See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210-11
(1950). See also Badger at 630.
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however, provides a more limited version
of the exhaustion doctrine than had been
judicially expounded, for it pertains only
to post-conviction habeas corpus.2 r Thus,
where habeas corpus is sought in ad-
vance of state trial, federal courts are no
longer bound by the exhaustion require-
ment-as where an individual is in cus-
tody under the authority of a state deputy
which has not been ordered by the judg-
ment of a state court. This modification
in the judicial doctrine was implemented
in order to insure that federal courts
could not be unduly hampered in the pro-
tection of federal officers who were being
prosecuted by the State for acts com-
mitted within the scope of their official
functions.27
A further reason for the limitation of
section 2254 to post-conviction cases is
related to the inherent conflict between
the exhaustion doctrine and the original
federal habeas corpus statute. The doc-
trine, as first enunciated in Royall, has
been criticized as a judge-made decision
to decline to hear cases over which Con-
gress had unmistakeably given the federal
courts jurisdiction. 2  One critic in partic-
ular asserted that it was beyond the
power of the Court to make such an ex-
ception to the statutory mandate of the
1867 Act and that "to pass from Royall
to an attitude which makes the dilatory
exercise of the habeas corpus jurisdiction
26Section 2254 applies only to "a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court.... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (Supp.
II, 1964-65) (emphasis added).
27 See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1948). See generally Comment, supra note
12, at 124-26.
28 See, e.g., Amsterdam at 900-01.
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a first principle, which reads deference to
the state judiciary into a statute designed
to abort state judicial proceedings, is
perverse." 219 However, these criticisms
were directed primarily at the Royall
doctrine in its anticipatory stage-prior
to the functioning of any state process
whatsoever. While the ruling was at-
tacked as an obtrusive interference with
the intended purpose of the writ as an
"immediate, supervening pre-trial federal
remedy," it was conceded that post-con-
viction habeas corpus cases did generate
certain evils that could be effectively
checked through the imposition of a rigid
exhaustion requirement. Furthermore,
the prescription of a statutory post-con-
viction exhaustion rule could be rational-
ized simply as an expression of attitudes
favoring state over federal post-conviction
criminal process.3 0  Therefore, it would
seem logical to conclude that Congress,
in enacting section 2254, desired to
eschew the pre-trial phase of habeas
corpus in order to avoid a strong display
of criticism which might have endangered
the effectiveness of the section as a
29 Amsterdam at 902 (footnotes omitted).
Among the sections of the 1867 Act which
Amsterdam felt had been contravened were:
[W]hen presented with a petition for habeas
corpus, a federal judge 'shall forthwith award
a writ of habeas corpus,' [Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385], 'shall pro-
ceed in a summary way to determine the
facts of the case,' [Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.
28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386], 'and if it shall appear
that the petitioner is deprived of his or her
liberty . . . . he or she shall forthwith be
discharged and set at liberty.' [Act of Feb.
5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386]. Id. at
901.
801d. at 902-03.
whole. Moreover, by limiting section
2254 to the post-conviction phase, it
would be possible to appease the critics
and at the same time deal aggressively
with the rash of evils which post-convic-
tion habeas corpus had unfortunately
produced. This reasoning becomes espe-
cially persuasive as it is recalled that as
far as pre-trial habeas corpus was con-
cerned, it appeared that greater evils
would result if the federal courts were
not empowered to secure the immediate
release of those individuals who had
been arrested merely as a means of inter-
fering with the exercise of their pre-
scribed duties as federal officers.
Among the alleged abuses of habeas
corpus which Congress sought to remedy
through the codification of the exhaustion
doctrine in section 2254 was the appur-
tenant irrationality of a system which
permits inferior federal district courts to
pass judgment upon convictions affirmed
by the justices of the highest state tri-
bunals. Also, the habeas corpus appara-
tus, in providing state prisoners with false
hopes of avoiding their prescribed fate
through an attack on the court which
convicted them, could easily have led to
a flood of litigation in the federal courts
due to an insurmountable number of
frivolous applications. 1  A consistent
and unbiased application of the exhaus-
tion of remedies requirement could con-
sequently help stem this flood and, as a
result, federal courts would be spared
31See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172-73 (1949). Note
that Chief Judge Parker was Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee which drafted
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1948.
unnecessarily burdensome workloads, and
the efficiency of the federal collateral
criminal process could more effectively
be maintained. It would thus seem then
that while the exhaustion requirement
should not be generally interpreted as a
"limitation coextensive with the habeas
corpus jurisdiction," such an approach
is at least somewhat justifiable in the
post-conviction area where such abuses
are inherently presented.
With an exhaustion limitation, the bulk
of federal litigation is significantly de-
creased, because by granting the state
process the first opportunity to vindicate
a would-be petitioner's constitutional alle-
gations, the likelihood arises that a state
court would release the prisoner or satis-
fy him that his claim is frivolous, or, at
any rate, limit and clarify the issues in-
volved. Such a procedure also unques-
tionably minimizes the possibility of
charges from state authorities that the
federal judiciary is unduly interfering
with and disrupting the operation of state
criminal procedures, and would help ease
unnecessary friction between these two
co-ordinate jurisdictions. A further argu-
ment in support of the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine involves the problem of
efficiency; state courts can best deal with
problems which generically involve local
attorneys, personnel, procedure and prac-
tices, and it seems that they should be
given the opportunity to aid federal
judges through an elucidation of pertinent
local law. Finally, the relegation of
federal claims to initial determination in
state courts encourages the state judiciary
to develop their law more consistently
with the developing body of federal pro-
tections for the individual, and in this
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manner, cooperation between state and
federal authorities in the area of criminal
justice is advantageously stimulated. 32
Section 2254 contains two exceptions
to the otherwise rigid and inflexible ex-
haustion of remedies rule. The first poses
few problems and logically indicates that
the exhaustion prerequisite may be dis-
pensed with if available state corrective
process is non-existent. If there are no
state remedies to be exhausted, it would
be ludicrous to require a habeas petitioner
to attempt to satisfy the requirement
anyway. Hence, if a state provides no
procedural scheme by which a state
prisoner could attempt to vindicate al-
legedly substantial federal claims-either
through appellate or collateral relief-the
exhaustion requirement will justifiably be
relaxed. But it should be noted that
today available state remedies are con-
sidered to be only those which are pres-
ently available to the petitioner at the
time he seeks federal relief. 33 The second
exception provides that exhaustion is not
necessary where there is found to exist
"circumstances rendering such [state cor-
rective] process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner." The application
of this "special circumstances" exception
does pose certain problems and has re-
sulted in a somewhat less rigid interpre-
tation of the exhaustion requirement.
32 Comment, Effect of Supreme Court Change
in Law on Exhaustion of State Remedies Re-
quisite to Federal Habeas Corpus, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1965); Amsterdam at
831.
3 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99
(1963).
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Since first conceived in Royall, the
"special circumstances" clause has evolved
coextensively with the exhaustion doc-
trine. However, neither the Supreme
Court, nor Congress in section 2254, has
supplied specific standards which would
uniformly govern its application, and thus
the existence of such circumstances ap-
pears to be a question that must be de-
fined through factual appraisal on an
ad hoc basis. But attempts have been
made by secondary authorities to cate-
gorize the various approaches taken by
federal judges in interpreting this statu-
tory exception." One such classification
involves those cases where immediate
action becomes necessary to avert inter-
ference with the authority and operations
of the federal government. In these
situations, a federal official who has not
applied for relief until after a state judg-
ment has been entered against him may
nevertheless be granted an immediate
habeas determination, for in such cases
"the urgency of indicating the federal
right combined with the delay which
would result if the official were restricted
to use the state process may operate to
[constitute] . . . the existence of circum-
stances rendering the state process in-
effective to protect the rights of the
prisoner." 35
Other categories of cases arising under
the section 2254 exception are those in
which time is a countervailing factor,3 6
34 See, e.g., Amsterdam at 892-94; Comment,
supra note 12, at 131-36.
35 Comment, supra note 12, at 131.
6 d. at 131-32, analyzing United States ex rel.
DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.
1954); Boyd v. O'Grady, 121 F.2d 146 (8th
Cir. 1941).
as where an existing paper remedy is
rendered ineffective in that before such
remedy can be pursued petitioner's con-
stitutional rights will be permanently
sacrificed; and those where numerous
prosecutions for petty offenses are likely
to be pressed in the state courts, thus
creating a situation where the burden
of trial and appeal is ordinarily greater
than the penalty imposed for convic-
tion...." 3 The exception has also
been invoked where procedural obstruc-
tions render theoretically available reme-
dial processes ineffective to protect a
state prisoner's rights-where alleged
state remedies have become nothing more
than a "procedural morass offering no
substantial hope of relief." 3 Conse-
quently, an individual will generally not
be required to resort to a state's machin-
ery for the enforcement of constitutional
rights where such machinery generates
inordinate delay because of "sophisticated
technicalities" and self-imposed limita-
tions. If the available state post-convic-
tion procedure does not satisfy the
Supreme Court's "swift and imperative
remedy" standard,3 9 a federal court would
be justified in entertaining a petitioner's
habeas corpus application even though
he had failed to exhaust his available
state remedies.4 0
37 Amsterdam at 893.
38 Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947)
(concurring opinion).
39See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).
40 United States ex rel. Shelton v. Rundle, 278
F. Supp. 819, 820-21 (E.D. Pa. 1968), citing
Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d 654 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967);
United States ex rel. Harper v. Rundle, 279 F.
Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
The Liberalizing Trend
The Noia-Townsend-Sanders Trilogy
In recent years, a liberal construction
of section 2254 by the Supreme Court
and the federal judiciary has resulted in
a distinct expansion in the scope of fed-
eral habeas corpus power and, contin-
gently, in a more varied and widespread
use of the Great Writ. This liberalized
interpretation of the section has neces-
sarily involved a relaxation of the rigid
application of the exhaustion requirement
and a considerably expanded utilization
of the "special circumstances" exception.
The landmark decision of Fay v. Noia 41
in 1963 initiated the trend by ruling that
section 2254's exhaustion requirement
referred only to a failure to exhaust
remedies still open :to the applicant at
the time he filed his application for
habeas corpus. In other words, proce-
dural defaults incurred by the applicant
during the state court proceedings would
no longer defeat the habeas corpus juris-
diction of the federal courts, 42 since a
41372 U.S. 391 (1963). Petitioner, whose
coerced confession claim had been decided ad-
versely at the state trial, allowed the time for
direct appeal to lapse without seeking state
appellate review.
42 Noia reserved one exception to this ruling-
forfeiture resulting from the deliberate by-pass-
ing of available state remedies:
If a habeas applicant, after competent coun-
sel or otherwise, understandingly and know-
ingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vin-
dicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any other
reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedure, then
it is open to the federal court on habeas to
deny him all relief if the state courts re-
fused to entertain his federal claims on the
merits. . . . 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (em-
phasis added).
14 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1968
mere forfeiture of remedies could not
legitimatize any unconstitutional conduct
by which a conviction might have been
obtained.4 3  It should also be noted that
the Noia Court further facilitated federal
habeas corpus review by extinguishing
the stipulation that a state prisoner must
first seek certiorari in the Supreme Court
from an adverse state decision in order
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, and
by refusing to extend the doctrine of
adequate and independent state proce-
dural grounds 44 as a limit to the powers
granted under the federal habeas stat-
utes.
45
The historical and somewhat technical
reasoning employed by the Noia Court in
arriving at their controversial conclusions
indicated that they wished to broadly ex-
But the Court warned that this grant of dis-
cretion was not intended as a means of in-
troducing legal fictions into habeas corpus.
Id.
43 "[D]ue process denied in the proceedings
leading to a conviction is not restored just be-
cause the state court declines to adjudicate the
claimed denial on the merits." 372 U.S. at
427.
44 See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590 (1874).
45 The Court emphasized that the adequate state
ground rule is a function of the limitations of
appellate review, and that while the Court's
appellate function is confined to judgments or
decrees of state courts, the original habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
is not similarly restricted. Rather, the juris-
dictional prerequisite of the habeas corpus
power is detention simpliciter. See 372 U.S.
391, 430-34 (1963).
It is interesting to note that both Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan grounded
their vigorous dissents on this refusal by the
majority to extend the adequate state ground
theory. See 372 U.S. at 445-76 (dissenting
opinions).
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pand the federal judiciary's habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction. By thus effectuating a
flexible construction of section 2254, the
Court initiated the liberalizing trend that
has led directly to recent dramatic abridg-
ments of the exhaustion doctrine, which
are in turn primarily responsible for the
aforementioned criticisms. Mr. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the majority in
Noia, insisted that the United States Con-
stitution compelled a generous construc-
tion of the federal courts' power to
dispense the writ,4 6 and that Congress,
in the 1867 Habeas Act, sought to pro-
vide a federal forum for state prisoners
with constitutional defenses by extending
the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to
its "constitutional maximum." 47 Justice
Brennan subsequently attempted to justify
the majority's position by emphasizing
that
[o]bedient to this purpose [of the 1867
Act], we have consistently held that fed-
eral court jurisdiction is conferred by the
allegation of an unconstitutional restraint
and is not defeated by anything that
may occur in the state court proceed-
46 Mr. Justice Brennan, in arriving at this
conclusion, pointed out that at the time the
suspension clause was written into the Con-
stitution, it was well settled that the writ
could test any restraint contrary to fundamental
law. Thus, a liberal construction of the fed-
eral courts' habeas powers was imperative if
the writ was to be dispensed in conformance
with accepted common law practice. 372 U.S.
at 406.
4 It should be pointed out that in 1867 the
scope of inquiry in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was substantially limited to whether
state courts had jurisdiction to try the prisoner,
and thus collateral attack was always open as
an alternative. See generally Badger at 631.
ings. State procedural rules plainly must
yield to this overriding federal policy.48
The wording of section 2254 itself served
to further justify the Court's restrictive
construction of the exhaustion rule and
to refute any contention that a failure
to exhaust past remedies would suffi-
ciently preclude federal habeas corpus
intervention. Use of the present tense
of the verb "has"-"if he [the applicant]
has the right under the law of the State
to raise, by any available procedure, the
questions presented"-argued strongly
that the section should be limited in its
application to a failure to exhaust cur-
rently available remedies. Furthermore,
it was significant that in Ex parte Hawk
there were no direct or indirect references
to past exhaustion, for section 2254 was
concededly enacted to codify the judicially
evolved rule particularly as formulated in
that case.4 9 Utilizing the foregoing argu-
ments, Mr. Justice Brennan presented
strong testimony to the effect that the
Noia interpretation of section 2254 was
firmly and incontrovertibly supported by
both history and logic.
On the same day the Noia opinion was
imparted, the Supreme Court further solid-
ified the federal habeas corpus power in
another landmark decision, Townsend v.
Sain.50  While Townsend was concerned
primarily with the exposition of the con-
48 372 U.S. 391, 426-27 (1963). The Court
had previously displayed a similar attitude in
Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959),
wherein it was noted that the sweep of the
jurisdiction granted by the broad phrasing of
the 1867 Act has remained unchanged.
49 372 U.S. at 434-35, 434 n.2. See note 25
supra and accompanying text.
50372 U.S. 293 (1963).
ditions under which a federal court must
grant an evidentiary hearing in a habeas
corpus proceeding,5 1 it also contained
dictum to the effect that if a petitioner's
constitutional claim had not been proper-
ly considered in the state trial because
evidence crucial to the adequate deter-
mination of such claim had not been fully
developed, a federal hearing would be
required and the Noia standard of "ex-
cusable default" would apply.5 2  Appar-
ently, the defendant would be entitled to
a de novo trial on all constitutional issues
in a federal forum after completing his
trip through the state judicial processes.
It would seem then that the rationale of
Noia and the dictum of Townsend con-
ferred upon the federal judiciary a some-
what plenary power to review state court
attempts to vindicate alleged constitution-
al violations. Yet, such a statement must
necessarily be clarified with a reminder
that in spite of the changes effectuated
by Noia and Townsend, the exhaustion
doctrine still retained considerable vitality;
a faithful attempt on the part of a habeas
petitioner to seek satisfaction through
those state procedures realistically open
to him was still required, and the con-
ditions mandating federal evidentiary
hearings were structured in such a man-
ner as to afford state tribunals the first
opportunity to adequately inquire into
511 It should be noted that these prerequisites
for a federal evidentiary hearing were later
substantially codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)
(Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1964).
52 See Annot., 9 L. Ed. 2d 1246, 1250 (1963).
This rule would not apply, however, if the
failure to develop the evidence was due to
petitioner's own inexcusable neglect.
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the relevant facts of the case and claim.
Sanders v. United States,53  decided
shortly after Noia and Townsend, com-
pleted the formulation of the Court's new
approach to habeas corpus exhaustion,
and should thus be mentioned at this
point. Considering the possible evils of
successive habeas corpus applications,
Mr. Justice Brennan, in explicating the
majority opinion, ensured that where a
petitioner has made prior application for
federal collateral relief and subsequently
raises a different ground in a new appli-
cation, or where the same ground was
previously presented but not adjudicated
on the merits, "[f]ull consideration of the
merits of the new application can be
avoided only if there has been an abuse
of the writ . . . remedy. . . ." 5 Con-
trolling weight could be given to the
denial of a prior application only if the
same ground had been determined ad-
versely, the prior determination had posi-
tively been on the merits, and the ends
of justice would not be served by reach-
ing the issues of the subsequent applica-
tion.
3a373 U.S. 1 (1963).
54 Id. at 17. In defining possible abuses of
the remedy, the Court explained that if, on
prior application, the prisoner deliberately with-
held one of two grounds with the hope of
getting two hearings, he might be deemed
to have waived the right to a hearing on the
second application presenting the withheld
ground.
Subsequently, in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b), (c)
(Supp. II, 1965-66), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(1964), Congress made it absolutely clear that
successive petitions would not be tolerated un-
less the federal court was fully satisfied that
the new ground had not been deliberately with-
held from the earlier application and that the
writ remedy was not otherwise abused.
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The principles expounded in the Noia-
Townsend-Sanders trilogy have served as
a guide for federal court interpretations
of the exhaustion requirement since 1963.
Resultantly, the number of federal habeas
corpus applications dismissed summarily
for failure to exhaust state remedies has
decreased considerably during this period,
as federal judges have striven to con-
sistently apply the standards imposed by
these three cases.55 Relying heavily on
Noia, federal courts for the first time
could justifiably choose to hear federal
claims which had never been raised on
the state level. For Noia's declaration
that a procedural default does not legiti-
matize the unconstitutional conduct be-
hind a conviction meant that issues which
a petitioner had failed to raise on state
appeal, thereby waiving any right to have
them determined in a state forum, could
properly be presented in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Through its repeated
and emphatic applications, the Noia pro-
geny has injected into federal jurispru-
dence an attitude of concerned regard for
the plight of the unconstitutionally in-
carcerated state prisoner. This attitude
has precipitated various attempts on the
part of the federal judiciary to more
substantially guarantee to such individ-
uals an opportunity to have their federal
claims vindicated at the earliest possible
stage of the judicial process. It is, of
5 See, e.g., Heidberg v. Pitchess, 362 F.2d 511
(9th Cir. 1966); Townsend v. Bomar, 331 F.2d
19 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dilworth v.
Sigler, 325 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1964) (per
curiam); Rohrer v. Montana, 237 F. Supp. 747
(D. Mont. 1965); Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F.
Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964).
course, preferable that this forum be
supplied by the state's appellate or col-
lateral apparatus; but if the attainment
of such a goal will result in unnecessary
delay or burdensome technicalities, fed-
eral courts have indicated that they will
resort to the habeas corpus jurisdiction
as a means of assuring a speedy and just
determination of these claims.
The Sniffen Modification and the
Roberts Doctrine
A prime indication of the direction in
which the federal courts will proceed in
this area has recently been provided by
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States ex
rel. Sniffen v. Follette.56 The petitioner
in Sniffen had been convicted of first
degree burglary and assault in a New
York county court on September 30,
1958. While no appeal was taken, sub-
sequent application was made in a state
court for a writ of coram nobis57 on the
grounds that his guilty plea had been in-
duced by the District Attorney's promise
of a lesser sentence 58 and that his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination had been
violated "when the trial judge subjected
6393 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
57 In New York the common-law writ of coram
nobis has been expanded to become the chief
means of post-conviction relief for state pris-
oners claiming an infringement of their con-
stitutional rights. See Lyons v. Goldstein, 290
N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
5sUnited States ex rel. Sniffen v. Follette, 393
F.2d 726, 727 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam),
citing Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220
(1927); United States ex rel. Thurmond v.
Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
In Kercheval, the Supreme Court emphasized
that a plea of guilty must not be accepted un-
less made voluntarily, after proper advice, and
him to questioning at sentencing." 59
However,' the writ of coram nobis was
ultimately denied.
After denial of leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals, petitioner sought fed-
eral habeas corpus relief in the District
Court for the Southern District of New
York, raising the same two claims that
had been passed upon by the state courts
and "as to which state remedies [had]
concededly been exhausted." 60 However,
the district court denied the relief sought
on the ground that petitioner was cur-
rently challenging the same criminal con-
viction in a second state coram nobis
proceeding and had thus failed to ex-
haust available state remedies as required
by section 2254, even though the latter
proceeding concerned a totally distinct
and separate claim from that advanced
in the habeas petition-"an alleged viola-
tion of his right to allocution." 61 Peti-
tioner then applied to the Court of
with a complete understanding of the conse-
quences that might follow. 274 U.S. at 223.
In Thurmond, the court noted that if the
state's agents made a promise calculated to
interfere with the defendant's ability to decide
rationally whether to stand trial or plead guilty,
the plea of guilty must be considered invalid
as a matter of law. 275 F. Supp. at 515.
9 393 F.2d at 727.
60 ld.
61 Id. The Supreme Court has held that
a denial of the right to allocution does
not warrant federal habeas corpus' relief
because error of this sort is neither juris-
dictional nor constitutional nor a fundamental
miscarriage of justice: "The failure of a trial
court to ask a defendant represented by an at-
torney whether he has anything to say before
sentence is imposed is not of itself an error
of the character or magnitude cognizable under
a writ of habeas corpus." Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit for a
certificate of probable cause and other
relief. The court of appeals concluded
that the district court erred in refusing to
consider the merits of petitioner's claim,
and, in reversing and directing the trial
court to hold an appropriate hearing on
the merits, held that a federal court can
not decline jurisdiction where state rem-
edies have been exhausted as to a federal
claim and the only proceeding pending
on the state level is wholly unrelated to
the issue before the federal court.
The Snitgen case has specifically con-
tributed to the current liberalizing trend
by applying and reaffirming the principles
recently espoused by the United States
Supreme Court in Roberts v. La Vallee.62
As the Snitfen court so emphatically
noted, Roberts signalled "the end of the
automatic and uncritical application of
the doctrine that pending applications for
state relief bar . . . consideration of
claims that are otherwise properly before
a federal court." 63 In Roberts, the in-
digent petitioner, at the time his case
was called for trial, requested that the
court furnish him with a free transcript
of a preliminary hearing at which im-
portant state witnesses had testified. 64
This request was refused pursuant to the
applicable New York statute,65 which
required the payment of a fee before a
copy of such transcript could be furnished
to a defendant.
Petitioner's subsequent conviction was
affirmed by the appellate division, leave
62389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
63 393 F.2d at 727.
64 389 U.S. at 41.
65 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 206.
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to appeal was denied by the New York
Court of Appeals, and the United States
Supreme Court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari. It must be noted here
that the federal claim objecting to the
denial of the preliminary hearing tran-
script was properly raised at all levels.
Petitioner then applied to the District
Court for the Northern District of New
York for a writ of habeas corpus, which
application was denied on the ground
that there existed no federal constitution-
al right to a free transcript. However,
shortly thereafter the New York Court
of Appeals held that the statutory fee
requirement as applied to an indigent was
an unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
tection under both the state and federal
constitution.61 Therefore, in petitioner's
subsequent appeal from the district
court's determination, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit concluded
that he should return to the state court
process and seek relief under the recent
New York ruling.
The United States Supreme Court, in
vacating the judgment of the court of
appeals, emphasized that their decisions
for more than ten years had clearly in-
dicated that it was contrary to the Federal
Constitution to condition the accessibility
of "instruments needed to vindicate legal
rights" upon a defendant's financial
status.67 Furthermore, in recalling that
66 People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d 993, 224
N.E.2d 730, 278 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1966).
67 389 U.S. at 42. See, e.g., Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (interposition of
financial consideration between indigent state
prisoner and his right to sue for his liberty
on the state level poses a violation of equal
protection of the laws); Draper v. Washington,
petitioner had clearly and unequivocally
made known his desire to obtain the
transcript at all levels of the judicial
process, the Roberts Court stressed the
fact that Congress, in section 2254, did
not intend to require "repetitious appli-
cations" to state courts nor to legislate
that the likelihood of success in a state
court would be sufficient to preclude
federal intervention.6s Thus, the Court
refused "to rule that the mere possibility
of a successful application to the state
courts [is] sufficient to bar federal relief
[warning that] [s]uch a rule would se-
verely limit the scope of the federal
habeas corpus statute." 69
The Roberts Court was in effect con-
firming the accepted interpretation of
372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963) (in preventing pe-
titioners from having stenographic support for
presentation of their separate contentions to the
appellate court, the state denied them guaran-
teed rights); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
20 (1956) (fact that state procedure prevented
indigent defendants from prosecuting an appeal
because they could not afford a certified copy
of the record with a stenographer's transcript
of the proceedings constituted a denial of equal
protection of the laws).
68 389 U.S. at 42, citing Brown v. Allen, '344
U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1953). .As far as the
purpose of section 2254 was concerned, the
Brown Court expressed a strong belief that Con-
gress did not wish to require "repetitious ap-
plications." Even after consideration of the
present subsection (c) of section 2254, it was
concluded that where all the required procedure
for state review of the convictions had been ex-
hausted, it would not be necessary for the
prisoner to also ask the state for collateral
relief. 344 U.S. at 447. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the legislative history of section 2254
see 344 U.S. at 447-50.
69Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43
(1967) (per curiam).
section 2254. Since its legislative his-
tory substantially indicated that the pro-
vision did not require repetitious appli-
cations to state courts, a state prisoner
who had completely exhausted one of
several alternative state remedies, e.g.,
direct appeal from his conviction or col-
lateral attack on the state level, would
be deemed to have satisfied the require-
ments of the section.70  Thus, where a
state prisoner had fully exhausted all of
the necessary procedural steps in one
scheme of post-conviction relief pro-
vided by the state, the mere possibility
that he might be successful in pursuing
a second state remedy still open to him
would not preclude relief in the federal
courts. It would seem fundamentally un-
fair and burdensome to require such an
individual to return to the state process
and prepare to exhaust a totally different
line of procedural relief. Not only would
such a construction of section 2254 work
an inordinate delay in the vindication
of a state prisoner's rights but also, in
states where unlimited, successive state
habeas corpus applications are permitted,
it would completely subvert the purpose
and scope of the federal habeas corpus
statute. The Roberts Court merely
applied this line of thought to a similar
set of circumstances. Where the peti-
70See Wood v. Crouse, 389 F.2d 747 (10th
Cir. 1968), which held that a petitioner who
asserted his claim in direct appeal to the state's
highest court would not also be required to
seek the state's collateral remedy. See also
Coleman v. Maxwell, 351 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.
1965); Whippler v. Balkcom, 342 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Morrison
v. Foster, 175 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1949).
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tioner has once adequately exhausted his
available state remedies and the state
courts had consistently rejected his
federal claim, a federal tribunal would not
be barred from granting habeas corpus
relief simply because intervening state
decisions clearly indicate that relief is
now available on the state level. The
mere possibility that petitioner could now
prevail in a second trip through the
state courts, because of the change in the
state law wrought by the intervening
decision, does not present a satisfactory
reason to forestall a federal court from
entertaining an application for a writ of
federal habeas corpus. The Court noted
that petitioner had thoroughly exhausted
his state remedies and that
[s]till more state litigation would be both
unnecessarily time-consuming and other-
wise burdensome. This is not a case in
which there is any substantial state
interest in ruling once again on
petitioner's case. We can conceive of no
reason why the State would wish to
burden its judicial calendar with a narrow
issue the resolution of which is pre-
determined by established federal prin-
ciples. 71
Therefore, petitioner's motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and the
writ of certiorari were granted, and the
judgment was vacated and remanded to
71 389 U.S. at 43. It appears that the Roberts
Court was attempting to provide for a built-
in exception to the principles being expounded.
The reference to "any substantial state inter-
est" would imply that there might arise a
situation where it would be more beneficial to
sacrifice the petitioner's time and energy in
order to provide the state process with a second
opportunity to vindicate the federal claims
involved.
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the court of appeals.7 2
The Sniffen decision followed a fortiori
from Roberts. As the court observed, it
was imperative that Sniffen received a
federal determination on the constitutional
claims presented. While his allegations
were clearly meritorious, 73 further state
proceedings would likely be unavailing,
since no intervening state or federal
decision on the specific substantive issues
involved had preceded his habeas corpus
application. In other words, the status
of the law remained virtually the same,
and thus there was no significant reason
for the state court to alter its position.
Furthermore, it was improbable that
Sniffen would be vindicated in a state
court on the only claim currently pend-
ing there, the denial of his right to
allocution.7 4  Therefore, while Roberts
would obviously have succeeded in a new
state action, the possibility of success in
a state court for Sniffen was admittedly
remote. These comparative observations
induced the Sniffen court to afford peti-
72 Mr. Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent should
also be noted. The dissent objected primarily
to the constitutional grounds upon which the
majority considered petitioner to be entitled to
habeas corpus relief. However, Mr. Justice
Harlan also took exception to the Court's hold-
ing that the intervening state decision would
not bar federal relief. In light of the Mont-
gomery opinion, the dissent concluded that
there existed under state law an adequate basis
for affording petitioner the relief he sought:
"Believing, as did the Court of Appeals, that
federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere
with the administration of justice in state
courts, particularly when this involves reaching
federal constitutional grounds unnecessarily....
I would affirm the decision below." 389 U.S.
at 44 (dissenting opinion).
7 See note 58 supra.
74See note 61 supra.
tioner the relief sought by relying on the
newly expounded Roberts doctrine:
If [as Roberts held] a federal court can-
not withhold decision where relief is
clearly available in a state court, it
would seem manifest that it cannot de-
cline jurisdiction where, as here, state
remedies have been exhausted on a claim
based upon federal law and the only
pending state proceeding is completely
unrelated to the issue before the federal
court.75
This holding was a logical outgrowth
of the court's basic interpretation of the
meaning of the Roberts pronouncement.
For the Sniffen court viewed the Roberts
decision as a staunch declaration that a
federal court cannot decline to entertain
a habeas application' raising a federal
claim once rejected by the state courts.76
Therefore, no problem would have been
presented if a coram nobis proceeding
had not been pending, because under
their own construction of Roberts the
court could not have dismissed Sniffen's
habeas corpus application without a
hearing since the issues presented had
previously been rejected by the state
courts.
Commentary
One phase of habeas corpus law which
will heavily feel the impact of the
Roberts doctrine involves state reform of
its post-conviction procedures to conform
with established federal standards. Where
a petitioner has exhausted his remedies
under the old procedure, federal courts
have generally tended to withhold habeas
relief in favor of giving the state a chance
75 393 F.2d at 727 (footnotes omitted).
76 Id.
to vindicate his alleged claims under the
new system. 7 This situation arises most
frequently where a petitioner asserts a
federal claim which has been affected by
a Supreme Court decision rendered after
the most recent state treatment of his
case and which significantly changes the
law in effect at that time. Under such
circumstances, if the previous state court
adjudication had been on the merits,
habeas petitioners have ordinarily been
returned to the state process in order
to afford the state an opportunity to
apply the law as changed to petitioner's
case.78 Federal courts have pursued such
a course especially where the state has
positively indicated that it will apply the
new law or would at least enlarge its
post-conviction remedies to ensure relief
in light of the new decision. 79
77See, e.g., Baines v. Swenson, 384 F.2d 621
(8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Hutson v.
Zeigler, 362 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1966); Brooks
v. Wainwright, 345 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1965);
United States ex rel. Campbell v. Rundle, 327
F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964); United States ex rel.
Kling v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.
1962).
7 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Martin v.
McMann, 348 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1965) (per
curiam); -Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546 (5th
Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Walker
v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965);
Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.
1965); Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th
Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Gallo v.
Follette, 270 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Barnette v. Gladden, 246 F. Supp. 250 (D.
Ore. 1965).
79 For a thorough discussion of the problem of
intervening Supreme Court changes in the law,
prior to Roberts, see Comment, supra note 32,
at 1305-10. Here, it was urged that a pe-
titioned court balance the probability that the
state will reconsider the petitioner's claim
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However, the doctrine promulgated by
the Court in Roberts indicates that
changes in the law wrought by intervening
Supreme Court decisions may no longer
have any effect on the fate of a habeas
petitioner who has once diligently pursued
available state processes. Essentially, the
principles espoused in Roberts strongly
suggest that the Supreme Court will no
longer tolerate any repetitious litigation
where it can feasibly be avoided without
interfering with the fundamental dictates
of due process. Little difference can be
seen between a situation where a state
appellate decision changes applicable
state law to conform with established
federal principles, as occurred in Roberts,
and that in which a state alters its post-
conviction apparatus so that previously
rejected claims affected by a recent Su-
preme Court decision can now be prop-
erly raised and vindicated in accordance
with the dictates of that decision. The
effect is the same in both instances-
proper state determination consistent
with federal practice has been guar-
anteed and relief is now clearly avail-
able. Therefore, where a state has re-
sponded positively to a change in the
law, either through procedural reform or
a pronouncement that it will faithfully
apply the new Supreme Court decision,
further state litigation would be as un-
necessarily time-consuming and burden-
some as the Court deemed it to be in
Roberts. Federal-state comity would not
against his interests in obtaining immediate fed-
eral review. However, the arguments presented
in the article have apparently been superceded
by the implications of the Roberts and Sniffen
decisions.
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be a sufficient reason to delay vindication
of petitioner's rights in either situation;
in as much as the state and federal
treatment of the claims would be identi-
cal, the ends of justice would be best
served by immediate federal disposition
of the matter rather than in affording the
state the first opportunity to correct any
previous violations. Thus, as in Roberts,
there would be no substantial state interest
in ruling once again on petitioner's case.
In considering the Sniffen treatment of
the Roberts decision, even broader
ramifications are evidenced. A prime
consideration behind the Sniffen holding
was that a further state proceeding "on
the claims before us" would be unavail-
ing. Thus, where state courts have
definitively indicated that they will refuse
to apply intervening Supreme Court
decisions retroactively, it would appear
that immediate federal determination of
the claims would again be justified, in as
much as affording the state courts a
second chance to consider petitioner's
claims in light of the new decision would
likely prove a useless and unavailing
gesture. Furthermore, since neither a
positive nor negative state response would
sufficiently preclude federal relief, it
would logically follow that where a state
gave no indication whatsoever of how it
would deal with an intervening decision,
state courts should similarly be denied
another chance to vindicate the con-
stitutional issues involved. Thus, under
the rationale of Roberts, as construed in
Sniffen, it appears that federal courts
will now be required to entertain all
habeas corpus applications otherwise
properly before them, notwithstanding any
changes in the applicable law rendered
by the Supreme Court subsequent to the
most recent state treatment of the case.
Reading the two cases in this :manner,
they can be viewed as an extreme but
inevitable result of the judicial attempts
to limit the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine since 1963,80 reinforcing the
growing attitude among the federal
judiciary that a state prisoner's attempts
to free himself from an unconstitutional
incarceration will be delayed or denied
only where he has not yet sought relief
on the state level or has knowingly and
intentionally forfeited rights reserved to
him under state procedure. 81
With Roberts the Supreme Court has
substantially quashed the practice of com-
pelling habeas petitioners to take a second
trip through the state courts whenever it
appears that the state will reconsider the
issues involved, a practice previously
justified by endless exhortations as to the
demands of federal-state comity.82 The
prime considerations are now timely vin-
dication and judicial efficiency rather
than appeasement of the state court
system. However, it remains to be seen
whether there are still some circum-
80 See notes 41, 50, 55 supra and accompanying
text.
81 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
370 n.1 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
435 (1963).
82 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kling v.
LaVallee, 306 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1962),
wherein the Court justified this practice with
the declaration that: "This is not an exercise in
futility and frustration. It is a recognition of
the principle that it 'would be unseemly in our
dual system of government for a federal dis-
trict court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation.'"
stances under which the Court will
tolerate repetitious litigation. The rather
inflexible language of Snifjen indicates
not,8 3 but the Court in Roberts seemed
to allow for a situation where a sub-
stantial state interest might compel a
reexamination by the state courts. Such
a case would undoubtedly constitute a
rare exception, and the burden of proof
would rest heavily with the state to show
the existence of such circumstances. One
remote possibility, though, might involve
a petitioner concurrently serving a second
sentence, the validity of which has not
been challenged, for here the prisoner
would not be entitled to his freedom even
if he were to prevail in the federal pro-
ceeding. Such an occurrence, possibly
in combination with a clearly frivolous
claim, could very well pose a sufficient
reason to stay federal relief in the light
of a change in state law, since neither
the demands of time nor justice would be
substantially impaired by allowing the
state to review its previous adjudication.
It is interesting to note that the atti-
tudes which motivated the Roberts hold-
ing have also led to recent federal
decisions where relief was granted even
though petitioner had concededly failed
to exhaust state remedies open to him at
the time that he filed his habeas corpus
application. In United States ex rel. Gary
v. Hendrick,84 for instance, the district
court indicated that while it did not
65"[In Roberts] [tlhe Supreme Court ruled
that a federal court cannot decline to enter-
tain an application for habeas corpus -raising
a federal claim rejected by the state courts
.... " 393 F.2d at 727.
84 238 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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affirmatively appear that the relator had
exhausted available remedies, no useful
purpose would be served by permitting
him to burden the Pennsylvania courts
with more petitions raising the same
allegations as the instant application,
especially where such claims were clearly
without constitutional merit. The court
thus proceeded to reach the merits of
petitioner's federal claims in denying the
application. In Rowe v. Peyton, 5
petitioner Rowe had pursued available
state remedies, but co-petitioner Thacker
had not. However, the court held that
the latter should not be required to
travel the same road as Rowe through
the state courts to raise an issue which
Virginia's highest court had recently
decided, in the absence of any indication
that the state was prepared to depart
from its former stand.86 The prevailing
trend thus implies that federal jurisdiction
need not await the exhaustion of state
remedies to a foregone conclusion; in
such circumstances, federal jurisdiction
may exist even where state remedies have
not been adequately exhausted:
application should not be necessary if
it is reasonably clear that the state will
refuse to take cognizance of the claim.
The timely resolution of federal rights,
as well as considerations of efficiency,
should outweigh what can only be termed
compulsive comity.87
85 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967), aft'd, Peyton
v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); accord, Bell v.
Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo. 1968).
The Bell court labeled such a set of circum-
stances as "practical exhaustion" of state
remedies.
86383 F.2d at 711.
87 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225,
229 (W.D.N.C. 1966), af/'d, 381 F.2d
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Sniffen can be viewed as an even more
extreme manifestation of this same atti-
tude. The court of appeals had demon-
strated that they will dispense with con-
siderations of comity even when a
petitioner is simultaneously attacking the
validity of his conviction in a state court.
The significance of this ruling becomes
more apparent when it is realized that
the federal district courts of New York
have in the past consistently and success-
fully applied the general rule that a
pending state coram nobis proceeding
challenging a conviction on constitutional
grounds, though it raises a different issue
from that presented in the district court,
constitutes an available state remedy
which must be exhausted before federal
habeas corpus is sought.8 And the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
itself impliedly consented to the validity
of such a rule. 9 Recalling the Roberts
warning that the mere possibility of a
successful state application is insufficient
to bar federal relief, the Sniffen court in
effect ruled that district courts of the
second circuit would no longer be per-
mitted to so justify denial of a habeas
application raising properly exhausted
constitutional claims where the pending
state proceeding was completely un-
636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 905 (1968), citing SOKOL, A HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 122 (1965).
88 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mahoney v.
Thomas, 257 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States ex rel. Realmuto v. Fay, 230 F.
Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States ex
rel. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
related to the issue before the federal
court.
It should be pointed out that the
Sniflen Court was not the first federal
tribunal to urge modification of the
exhaustion requirement in this manner.
Only recently, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in dictum, also main-
tained that a separate claim for relief
pending in a state court would not bar
federal adjudication of a different and
unrelated constitutional allegation as to
which state remedies have been ex-
hausted. 90 The court also emphasized
that the desirability of including all
habeas corpus grounds in a single petition
could not possibly outweigh the legitimate
interest of a state prisoner in getting
speedy federal consideration of properly
asserted claims that had been un-
successfully urged before the state
courts.91  Considering Roberts, Sniffen
and the actions of the Third Circuit,
indications are that other federal courts
will soon proceed in a similar direction.
Further note should be made of the fact
that nothing in the Sniffen opinion
suggests that the court's holding will have
any effect on cases where the claim pend-
ing in the state court is the same as or
closely related to that raised in the federal
petition.9 2  In such circumstances, it
89 United States ex rel. Krzywosz v. Wilkins,
336 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1964).
'10 United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 372
F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam)
(dictum).
91Id. at 112.
92 See, e.g., United States ex rel. DeFlumer v.
Mancusi, 380 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1967) (per
curiam) (issue pending on state level, i.e.,
voluntariness of guilty plea, would necessarily
appears that district courts will still be
justified in refusing to act on the habeas
application; for where the completion of
at least one exhaustion of state remedies
is in doubt, that doubt can best be
resolved in favor of a procedure giving
the state a chance to determine the con-
stitutional questions posed. 93 Here, con-
siderations of comity are appropriate,
since the possibility exists that the issues
raised by the claim before the federal
court have not yet been fully considered
by the state courts pursuant to the
dictates of section 2254.
One week after the Sniffen decision
was rendered, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals further crystallized their
position on exhaustion in United States
ex rel. Levy v. McMann. 4 Levy and
co-petitioner D'Antonio had both ex-
hausted available state remedies on their
affect coerced confession claim raised in federal
petition, because a voluntary guilty plea entered
on advice of counsel would constitute a waiver
of non-jurisdictional defects in any prior stage
of the proceedings); United States ex rel.
McBride v. Fay, 370 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1966)
(per curiam) (claim alleging that petitioner
was denied fair trial because of circumstances
surrounding re-reading of the co-defendant's
confession would so necessarily be affected by
outcome of claim alleging that procedures used
to admit confession into evidence deprived
him of right to confront witnesses, that federal
consideration of former claim would have to
await determination that petitioner could not
seek consideration of latter claim in state
courts); United States ex rel. Hicks v. Fay,
230 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (allegation
that petitioner was deprived of right to appeal
from his conviction because of indigency pend-
ing simultaneously in federal and state courts).
93 Application of Stevens, 234 F. Supp. 25, 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
94 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1968).
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principal claim-that they were denied
due process when the State called one
Daniel Cohen as a witness to testify. 5
But Levy's petition also presented two
further claims as to which state remedies
had not been exhausted, i.e., that Cohen's
testimony was coerced and that he was
denied his right to confront and cross-
examine the witness. While D'Antonio's
petition included only the principal claim,
in a previously dismissed petition he had
included two other grounds which had
not been properly presented to the state
courts-denial of trial by jury and denial
of a fair trial due to the conduct of the
court and the state. The district court
dismissed Levy's petition for failure to
exhaust state remedies, and D'Antonio's
new petition was also rejected on the
ground that he was attempting to circum-
vent the exhaustion requirement by
fragmentizing the claims presented.
In reversing, the Second Circuit held
that the district court should have con-
sidered the merits of the exhausted
claims. Relying on Roberts and Sniffen,
the court concluded that since Levy's un-
exhausted coercion claim was not related
to his principal claim, there was no basis
for dismissing the petition in toto.
Furthermore, even though his other un-
exhausted claim might be so related, it
- Cohen, after implicating the two defendants
in the crime through a signed statement, ad-
vised both the state and court that he would
assert his privilege against self-incrimination.
Notwithstanding, the court ordered him to take
the stand, permitted the state to read his pre-
vious statement, and held him in contempt.
Thus, on the following day Cohen agreed to
testify. Id. at 403.
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could be dispensed with as frivolous. 6
The court felt that dismissing the entire
petition would be a waste of both
petitioner's and the state's time and
might unfortunately force petitioner to
accept the alleged injustices through
frustration and exhaustion of his own
energies.9 7  Since the unexhausted claims
in D'Antonio's prior petition were un-
related to the exhausted claims in his
present application, his case followed a
fortiori from Levy's. Under the circum-
stances surrounding both cases, the court
balanced prompt federal consideration of
the exhausted claims against the pro-
priety of including all allegations in a
single application and concluded that it
would be better to risk fostering "needless
piecemeal litigation" by considering the
exhausted issues than to severely limit
the scope of the habeas corpus statutes
by refusing to do so. 98
Apparently the court felt that their
holding here was a logical and imperative
outgrowth of Sniffen. After compelling
district courts to act on exhausted
federal claims when unrelated claims
were pending in a state action, it would
be hypocritical to require those same
96 The court pointed out that counsel did have
an opportunity to cross-examine Cohen the next
day when he took the stand to testify. Id. at
404 n.5.
97 Id. at 404. This possibility of exhausting
the petitioner rather than his remedies was
first conceptualized by Judge Friendly in
United States ex rel. Kling v. LaVallee, 306
F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion). See also Whitley v. North Carolina,
357 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1966).
98394 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1968), citing
Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
courts to dispense with concededly ex-
hausted claims merely because unex-
hausted, though unrelated, issues were
included in the same petition. Levy does
not represent a radical shift from previous
habeas corpus adjudication, since federal
courts have often seen fit to reach the
merits of exhausted claims while refusing
to entertain unexhausted grounds sub-
mitted at the same time; 99 however, in
its vigorous justification of this practice
and its firm reliance upon Sniflen and
Roberts, the court in Levy strongly con-
tributed to and reaffirmed the liberalizing
trend that has encouraged increased
circumvention of the exhaustion rule in
recent years. Once again hyper-technical,
burdensome and time-consuming require-
ments have been lifted in favor of an
interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine
which exhausts the remedies rather than
the petitioner himself. But note that
nothing said in the Levy extension of
this trend indicates that the validity of
cases dismissing in toto petitions where
the exhausted claims were directly related
9 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tangredi v.
Wallack, 343 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1965), where-
in issues concerning the admissibility of in-
criminating statements and the possibility that
the trial was tainted by unfair, prejudicial
publicity were both dismissed for petitioner's
failure to avail himself of the state's coram
nobis remedy, but the district court's order
relating to the claim of sufficiency of the in-
dictment was affirmed on the merits. Accord,
Pacheco v. Carberry, 389 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.
1968); Conway v. Wilson, 368 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 925 (1967);
Cline v. Peyton, 280 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Va.
1968); United States ex. rel. Conard v. Ma-
roney, 218 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
But see Terry v. Denno, 254 F. Supp. 909,
910-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
to or necessarily affected by the unex-
hausted would be in any way impaired.10 0
Thus, it is evident that the profuse
criticism which has been leveled at the
liberalization of federal habeas corpus
since 1963, and contingently upon modi-
fication in the application of the exhaus-
tion requirement, has had a surprisingly
negligible effect upon the actual course
of recent developments in habeas corpus
law. Congress did not ratify the pro-
posed amendment which would have ab-
rogated the federal courts' habeas corpus
power in the criminal sphere, and the
final version of the administration's omni-
bus anti-crime bill in no way diminished
the scope of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction.'o0 Furthermore, not only
have the federal courts sought to modify
the exhaustion requirement in Roberts,
Sniflen, Levy and the other cases noted,
but also the Supreme Court has taken di-
rect steps to categorically expand the
scope of the conferred habeas corpus
100 See, e.g., United States ex rel. DeFlumer
v. Mancusi, 380 FR2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1967)
(per curiam); United States ex rel. Martin v.
McMann, 348 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1965) (per
curiam); Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th
Cir. 1965).
101 For a discussion of the possible constitu-
tional, historical and policy objections to the
proposed section 2256, see the brief by the
dissenting minority of the Judicial Committee
in S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
157-60 (1968). See also Wright and Sofaer,
Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction for State
Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Re-
sponsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 894-95 (1966),
wherein the discretionary nature of both appeal
and certiorari and the fact-finding ability of
the lower federal courts were cited as factors
discouraging any attempt to remove the federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction.
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power. For example, in Peyton v.
Rowe,102 the Court in effect overruled the
restrictive "prematurity doctrine" which
had previously required a state prisoner
serving consecutive sentences to wait until
the first expired before he could initiate a
habeas corpus attack on the second.
Similarly, in Carafas v. La Vallee,10 3 the
Court held that federal jurisdiction is not
defeated if the prisoner is released from
prison prior to the completion of the
proceedings on his habeas application,
thus eliminating any misconception that
actual physical custody is always pre-
requisite to the issuance of habeas corpus
relief.104
Conclusion
It would thus seem that the federal
judiciary, in balancing the needs of state
criminal processes against the prospect of
guaranteeing full adjudication of state
prisoners' federal claims, have tipped the
scales in favor of the latter. Apparently,
they feel it is of greater import to secure
vindication of constitutional rights than
to insure the finality of state court judg-
ments.1"' The adoption of this attitude
is not surprising in light of the Supreme
Court's recent efforts to expand the scope
102 391 U.S. 54 (1968), afj'g Rowe v. Peyton,
383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967).
103391 U.S. 234 (1968).
104 The holding indicates that physical custody
is not required where, as a consequence of the
conviction, the petitioner is deprived of certain
privileges or will otherwise be detrimentally
affected by the adverse judgment.
105 A similar balancing test was recently applied
with similar results by the Supreme Court in
relation to a gambler's privilege against self-
incrimination. See Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. The past decade has been
marked by numerous landmark decisions
which have extended almost all of the
rights secured under the first ten amend-
ments to state criminal proceedings, and
the Court has firmly proclaimed that it
will no longer tolerate the imprisonment
of any individual who has been deprived
of his liberty without due process of
law.106  With the emergence of this
developing body of protections for the
individual, it was inevitable that federal
courts would seek to expand the scope of
their habeas corpus jurisdiction in order
to insure federal relief in instances where
the states have failed to take cognizance
of these newly defined liberties.
The resultant modifications of the
exhaustion doctrine can thus be viewed
as an effort to aid federal courts in
securing compliance with the dictates of
these Supreme Court decisions by
eliminating any unwarranted harassments
arising from "unseemly conflicts of juris-
diction." However, the actions of the
Roberts, Sniffen and Levy courts in this
regard do raise serious questions relating
to the efficiency and administration of
our dual system of criminal justice. Since
Noia was rendered in 1963, the number
of habeas corpus applications has con-
cededly increased at an alarming rate,
and the figures continue to accelerate
tremendously with the further erosion of
106 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
the exhaustion requirement.'0 7 In fact, it
has been ascertained that habeas corpus
proceedings presently constitute as much
as thirty per cent of the workload of the
federal courts.10 s Consequently, with the
less rigid implementation of the exhaus-
tion requirement, many state prisoners
have begun to look toward the federal
courts rather than the state process as
the ultimate forum for disposition of
their constitutional allegations. Thus,
while the principles espoused in Roberts
and Sniffen are justifiable, the federal
efforts to modify exhaustion in order to
insure vindication of constitutional rights
107 From 1963 to 1964, the number of federal
habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners
rose from 1,903 to 3,531, as compared to a
change of 127 to 906 from 1940 to 1961. In
1965, the figure jumped to 4,664, an increase
of 32.1% over 1964. Another new high of
5,162 was attained in 1966, representing an in-
crement of 10.7% over 1965. (Note that
these figures exclude the District of Columbia,
Canal Zone, Guam and the Virgin Islands.)
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 104 (1966); Id. at 156 (1964).
The significant increases from 1963-1964 and
1964-1965 were a direct consequence of the
Noia decision. However, the substantial in-
crease from 1965-1966 indicates that the less
rigid approach to exhaustion evidenced in
recent district and circuit decisions has con-
tinued to accelerate the number of habeas
petitions filed. Yet it must be conceded that
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation
of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment, providing many new possible grounds for
relief, has also been a major factor contrib-
uting to the rising number of applications.
108 Address by Hon. W. Walter Braham in
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(1968).
have admittedly interfered with the
effectiveness and stability of state criminal
procedures.
The resolution of this controversy can
only be achieved through a realization
that guaranteed vindication of federal
claims and the preservation of effective
state administration of criminal justice
are not mutually exclusive alternatives.
By initiating reforms in their own post-
conviction procedures so as to ensure
relief in conformance with the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on individual
rights, and by authorizing their collateral
apparatus to reverse convictions secured
under constitutional as well as jurisdic-
tional defects' 0 9 the state courts will once
again be able to assume the primary role
in securing relief for those individuals
claiming an infringement of constitutional
rights. For the prime concern of the
federal judiciary is not the interposition
of habeas corpus into the process for
review of state prisoners, but rather the
proper and timely disposition of federal
claims, hopefully in one trip through the
state court system.
However, until the states initiate the
necessary reforms in their post-conviction
10 See United States ex rel. Harper v. Rundle,
279 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1967):
"The effectiveness of a state post-conviction
procedure in remedying possible constitutional
violations must be commensurate with that of
federal habeas corpus. In other words, the
procedure must offer a 'swift and imperative
remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.'" (footnotes omitted).
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procedure,11 federal habeas corpus will
continue to serve as the dominant means
of vindicating constitutional rights, and
federal courts will persist in their circum-
vention of the exhaustion requirement
where its invocation would result in un-
necessarily burdensome and time-con-
suming technicalities. Considering the
origins of the exhaustion doctrine as a
matter of federal-state comity, no con-
stitutional or statutory objections will
conceivably be raised by the continued
efficacy of this trend. Nor will it result
in the indiscriminate release of "heinous
criminals" who, though obviously guilty,
suffered minor deprivations of due
process while being convicted. For only
a small percentage of state prisoners
filing habeas corpus applications are in-
deed successful, and the actual figure here
has remained relatively stable since the
first individual rights cases were ren-
dered."' Thus, it can safely be concluded
110Apparently, the Supreme Court has the
authority to order states to provide adequate
post-conviction remedies and will resort to
this power if the states fail to act. See Jenn-
ings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); Young
v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). See general-
ly Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal
Habeas Corpus, 80 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1966).
11Before the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of due process under the fourteenth
amendment, approximately 2% of habeas
corpus petitioners were successful. In 1963,
the figure was 2 25%; in 1965, 3.84%; and
approximately 2% in 1966. Address by Hon.
W. Walter Braham, supra note 108. See also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 n.45; 1966
JUDICIAL CONF. REP., supra note 107, at 84.
Even those petitioners who do succeed do
not automatically secure their freedom; rather,
the accepted practice is that of "conditional
release," where the state is permitted to re-
HABEAS CORPUS
that other federal courts will soon emulate
the actions taken by the Second Circuit in
the Sniflen and Levy decisions and will
further erode the exhaustion requirement
whenever it threatens to unnecessarily
interfere with the prompt disposition of
state prisoners' federal claims. And the
ultimate goal of restoring state criminal
process to a primary role in the vindica-
arrest and retry the habeas petitioner without
releasing him from custody. 372 U.S. at 440-
41. Federal courts in granting relief might
even direct a new trial within a reasonable
time. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Floyd v.
Wilkins, 367 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966).
ST. THOMAS MORE
(Continued)
always ahead of the pack intellectually,
foreseeing each move, and serving his
King to the last! Statesman, lawyer, judge,
humanist, capitalist, saint-this 16th
century Socrates is a man for our times
when old questions arise: Is the State
supreme? Is there a moral law above
the laws of the State? Like Antigone,
like Christ, More appealed to a power
above the judge, upheld as he was by that
tion of constitutional rights will remain
unattainable 112 until the state court
systems expand their own conceptions of
due process to coincide with those of
the United States Supreme Court.
112 The recent amendments to the Judicial Code
which have restored a modified res judicata
requirement to federal habeas corpus [28
U.S.C. § 2244(b), (c) (Supp. II, 1965-66)]
and bestowed a presumption of correctness
upon the state court records used in federal
habeas proceedings [28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)
(Supp. II, 1965-66)] indicate that the restora-
tion of state process to a primary role in the
vindication of state prisoners' constitutional
rights is a continuing and compelling consid-
eration.
power, the power of the Spirit. I give
him to you as a model. An impossible
one? Never. For the Spirit is with us
still, and the Spirit is still, and eternally,
power. Let us follow the loving, kindly,
humorous lawyer, this Thomas More,
who, buoyed up by that Spirit, comforted
his friends, as they mourned over his
coming beheading: "After all," he said,
"a man may lose his head-and still
come to no harm!"
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